It arrives on a Tuesday mid-morning, from the supplier’s usual email address. It has their signature, their logo and a reference to this month’s invoice. It says they changed banks after an internal audit and asks that, starting with this payment, the money go to a new account. A bank statement header is attached.
Accounts payable updates the account, schedules the transfer and moves on. Three weeks later the supplier calls to ask why they have not been paid.
It has a name, and it is one of the costliest
It is called business email compromise, or BEC. The FBI defines it as a scam aimed at businesses that work with suppliers and regularly pay by wire transfer, carried out by compromising email accounts and other channels such as phone numbers and video meeting apps.
Its 2025 report ranks it second among crimes by reported losses, behind only investment fraud: 24,768 complaints and just over $3.046 billion, up from $2.77 billion the year before. Those are U.S. figures, where the count is most complete, and they only include what someone reported.
You do not need to be a large company. All it takes is paying suppliers by transfer and having someone in the company who can change a bank account because an email asked them to.
Why it works
There are two versions, and the second one is the dangerous one:
- A look-alike domain.
supplier-mx.cominstead ofsuppliermx.com, or a swapped letter nobody notices on a phone. It gets caught if someone reads the full address. - The supplier’s real mailbox, taken over. Someone got into it, read the conversations for weeks and writes from there, in the same thread, in the same tone, right when a payment is due. There is nothing odd to see in the address.
The bank statement does not prove anything either: a PDF takes minutes to fake. The trick is not in the technology but in the process, because the only control between an email and a transfer is someone reading it and believing it. That is why the defense is a process too.
The control that stops it
1. An account change is confirmed through another channel. It is the FBI’s first recommendation: verify any request to change account information through a different channel. In practice, you call the phone number already in the supplier’s file, not the one in the email, and you talk to the person you know. If the email says “don’t call, I’m in a meeting,” all the more reason to call.
2. Two people. Whoever receives the request is not the one who approves it. One person enters the change, another authorizes it after the call, and there is a record of who did what and when.
3. A newly changed account does not get the big payment the same day. A waiting period, or a small first payment the supplier confirms by phone, takes away what the fraudster needs most: urgency.
4. Be wary of urgency and secrecy. “It has to go out today,” “don’t mention this to anyone,” “the director is traveling.” Those are the signature of fraud, not of your supplier.
5. Protect your own email too. The scam works in reverse: someone gets into your collections mailbox and sends your customers your “new account.” Two-step verification on every mailbox, starting with payables and collections, is the minimum. And if you do not know who controls your domain, start there.
The control lives in the system, not in someone’s memory
A written policy helps, but on the day there is a rush nobody reads it. What works is a system where your suppliers live that does not allow it any other way:
- A supplier’s bank account is not edited in a cell. A change stays pending until a second person approves it.
- The system keeps the previous account, who requested the change, who approved it and the note from the verification call.
- The first payment to a changed account is flagged for review.
If your suppliers’ accounts live today in a spreadsheet anyone can edit, there is no way to know who changed what or when. Many ERPs can be configured for this approval, and when the system lacks it, it is a small module. Few changes cost so little compared with what they protect.
If it already happened
Time is the only thing that matters. The FBI’s own words: if you discover a fraudulent transfer, time is of the essence.
- Call your bank immediately and ask them to recall or hold the transfer. Every bank has its own policies, so it pays to know ahead of time what yours can do.
- If the payment left a U.S. account, report it at ic3.gov, regardless of the amount and with the full transaction details. The FBI’s recovery team works with banks to freeze funds: in 2025 it acted on 3,900 incidents and froze $679 million, 58% of the attempted theft.
- If it left a Mexican account, file a criminal complaint with the state prosecutor’s office besides notifying the bank. You will need it for any later claim.
- Check the mailbox. If the email came from the supplier’s real mailbox, tell them: someone is inside and may be writing to their other customers. If it came from your side, change passwords, look for forwarding rules nobody created and turn on two-step verification.
Where we come in
Reviewing who can change a bank account, how it gets approved and where it is recorded is part of what we do in a consulting engagement or technology audit for companies of every kind in Juárez and El Paso. When the control does not exist in the system, we build it. If you want to know what to check first, Chira asks the questions and tells you in writing. And if you would rather talk it through, book a call.
References
- 2025 IC3 Annual Report, FBI — defines BEC, gives complaints and losses for 2023 to 2025, and the Recovery Asset Team’s 2025 results.
- Business Email Compromise, IC3 — the FBI’s prevention tips and what to do if it happens.